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Key message points 
 
 Appreciation of human factors can provide useful insights into the reduction of 
risks through intuitive device design and the management of contributory 
factors in the environment  
 Risks of implants relate to the way in which devices are designed and used 
rather than to their pharmacological properties  
 The risks associated with the use of contraceptive implants include non-




Risk management is generally understood to include the documented processes for 
identifying hazards associated with a product or service, evaluation and control of 
those risks, and monitoring of the effectiveness of the risk controls throughout the 
lifetime of the product or service (e.g. ISO 14971)1.  This definition applies as much 
to healthcare as to other industries.   
 
This paper provides an assessment of the risks associated with the insertion and 
removal of contraceptive implants.  The importance of device and equipment design 
to patient safety in the NHS has long been recognised in areas such as ambulance 
design, infection control and drug administration2.  Commonly referred to as 
“mistake-proofing”, thoughtful design can help to reduce and manage "use errors"3.  
Such errors refer to failures or breakdowns in the use of a device rather than to 
“human error”, which locates the error within the user.  In relation to contraceptive 
implants, three types of incident repeatedly feature in a range of countries: non-
insertion, deep insertion and nerve injury during removal.  Risks to patient safety 
relate to the way the insertion device is designed and used, rather than to the 
pharmacological properties of the implant itself.  Suggestions will be made as to how 
risks identified relating to the use (i.e. insertion and removal) of contraceptive 
implants may be reduced through intuitive device design and through the 
management of contributory factors in the environment, within a systematic risk 
management process. 
 
This article was initially conceived before any information on the redesigned 
applicator of the new contraceptive implant, Nexplanon , became available.  The 
first part of the article is based on an examination of Implanon , and comments on 
its design following review of the associated risks.  The second part is an initial 




Contraceptive implants are highly effective long-acting reversible contraceptives with 
a good safety record4. Uptake in the UK has been increasing since the publication in 
2005 of the NICE guideline on long-acting reversible contraception5 and its 
subsequent promotion nationally.  Contraceptive implants are currently used by 1-2% 
of women of childbearing age in Britain6, as many as a quarter of a million women. 
Worldwide, about 6 million women use this method7.  With such widespread use, rare 
adverse effects may nevertheless have a substantial impact on the population. 
 
 
Breakdown of the insertion procedure into key steps 
The following five steps in the insertion procedure provide the basis for analysis of 
errors that have been reported with Implanon. 
 
Step 1  The applicator is picked up and held by the clinician 
Step 2  The skin is punctured with the needle tip 
Step 3  The needle is advanced under the skin 
Step 4  The position of the hands is changed. The seal is broken and the obturator 
turned through 90º with one hand, the other hand stabilising the cannula/needle 
Step 5  One hand fixes the obturator while the other hand retracts the cannula/needle 
 
It should be noted that during steps 1 to 3, the position of the clinician's hand is 
constant.  The diagram in the Summary of Product Characteristics (SPC)8 shows the 
cannula/needle being held from above between thumb and index finger, by its ridged 







Non-insertion was not reported with the first available implant in the UK, Norplant : 
the technique used involved inserting and withdrawing a trocar (six times) but differed 
from Implanon insertion in that the six Norplant capsules each had to be placed in the 
trocar by the operator.  Implanon is supplied pre-loaded in its inserter.  Non-insertion 
was reported in the Implanon trials (incidence 0.2%) but differed from non-insertions 
reported from post-marketing surveillance, as the problem was recognised in the 
trials at the time of the insertion procedure9.  
 
Non-insertion has been picked up in post-marketing surveillance in Australia, France 
and the UK10.  The Australian medical indemnity insurer, MDA National, received an 
unprecedented number of adverse incident reports and responded by applying the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management11. It was apparent from 
the Australian analysis that the clinicians were unaware that their technique was 
faulty.  The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners was enlisted to develop 
guidelines for insertion of Implanon, which included palpation of the implant under the 
skin after insertion by both the woman and the clinician and documentation of this 
action.  
 
In retrospect it appears that many clinicians found the procedure of withdrawal of the 
introducer while keeping the obturator fixed (Step 5) counterintuitive, as it is opposite 
to the technique used with a syringe and needle.  The fact that the placebo implants 
used in the training sessions were blue and the commercial product was white was 
found to be confusing, as the implant does not contrast in colour with the obturator.  
Non-insertion is always due to human error.  It was postulated that it could be due to 
the implant falling out if the needle guard is removed with the needle held at a 
downward angle12.  Since this eventuality was mooted, the manufacturer has 
included the advice that the applicator is held “in the upward position … until the time 
of insertion”. This possible problem is anecdotal: the implant is held tightly in the 
needle and does not drop out when the applicator is held tip-down and this event has 
never been documented in case reports.  
 
Implanon has rigorous manufacture and quality control procedures that accord with 
Good Manufacturing Practice Guidelines13.  The possibility of an implant being 
absent from the applicator as supplied is very remote.  It therefore appears likely that 
most cases of non-insertion are due to removal of the whole applicator system from 
the arm with the implant still in situ within the device (error in Step 5).  These events 
generally occur despite clinicians having received appropriate training.  
 
Litigation is rare but has occurred repeatedly in connection with non-insertion of 
Implanon10.  In the experience of the first author, clinicians who are the subjects of 
errors resulting in litigation are not confined to the untrained, those with limited 
experience or those who are known to be poor performers. 
 
Deep insertions 
Contraceptive implants should be inserted into the subdermal plane.  Deep insertion 
is generally thought to be associated with poor insertion technique rather than 
migration of a properly inserted implant10.  This problem therefore occurs at Step 3.  
Insertion instructions have always emphasised the importance of advancing the 
applicator parallel to the skin surface.  Current expert opinion on localisation and 
removal of deep implants is outlined in the accompanying paper10. 
 
Nerve injury 
The recommended site for both Norplant and Implanon was 6 - 8 cm above the 
elbow crease, in the groove between the biceps and triceps muscles.  The 
neurovascular bundle runs quite superficially here; the anatomy is detailed in the 
accompanying paper10.  Although nerve damage is a rare complication of 
contraceptive implants, it is clearly a serious one.  Insertion immediately over the 
groove is unwise10.  In June 2007 the manufacturer revised the SPC, deleting 
reference to the biceps/triceps groove.  The recommended site was changed to 6 - 8 
cm above the medial epicondyle of the humerus, which is behind the groove.  This 
particular risk is not amenable to solution by improvement of the product design. 
 
Needlestick injury 
To the authors’ knowledge this has not been a particular concern with Implanon, but 




Scientific writing on implants usually concentrates on the clinical effectiveness and 
pharmacological safety of the drug itself14-17.  However, review of the risks associated 
with the insertion and removal of contraceptive implants10 suggests that some of the 
issues are due to human factors, related to the way clinicians perform the insertion 
procedure as well as to the conditions under which it is performed.  For example, 
non-insertion and deep insertion are clearly linked to human action and interaction 
with the device rather than with the pharmacological properties of the drug.  Such 
occurrences are usually referred to as “human error”.  Could we apply lessons from 
other industries and other areas of healthcare to reduce the likelihood of errors in the 
use of the insertion device, i.e. to “mistake-proof” the activity through design?  
Guidance on this question is available.  Reason’s highly influential accident causation 
model18, the notion of 'Affordances'19, and Risk Management and Usability 
Engineering processes as recommended for medical device manufacturers, are all 
helpful in this regard.     
 
 
A Systems perspective on adverse events 
In safety-critical industries as well as in healthcare, Reason’s accident causation 
model (the so-called Swiss-Cheese model)18 is the standard framework in which to 
approach and to understand adverse events from a systems perspective.  The main 
assumption of the model is that human errors should be regarded as symptoms of 
underlying system deficiencies rather than as causes of adverse events as such. 
Deficient organisational processes include poor processes for specifying and 
updating procedures, for purchasing and maintaining equipment and stock, for 
identifying training needs and ensuring access to training, and low priority given to 
safety and quality.  These lead to latent conditions in the work environment where 
failures are more likely to occur.  This is illustrated in Fig. 1.   
 
   
Fig. 1:  Reason’s model of Organisational Accidents18 
 
This model highlights the importance of giving consideration to the wider context 
within which contraceptive implants are used.  Table 1 provides examples of generic 
questions that should be addressed within the risk management process.  For each 
influencing factor, examples are given of questions that lead one to explore this 
particular aspect of risk assessment.  The Table uses a classification of influencing 
factors proposed by Vincent et al20.   At present, there is unfortunately little 
systematic data and evidence available on these factors in relation to the use of 














Table 1:  Examples of factors affecting the activity of insertion of contraceptive 
implants and corresponding lead questions for risk management. 
 
Influencing Factor Example of Lead Questions 
Task  Is the standard procedure for inserting 
contraceptive implants known to staff?  
 Do staff have sufficient time available to follow 
the procedure?  
 Are there reported problems with this task?  
Device  Has a  training package been devised for using 
the insertion device?  
 Is the insertion device easy and intuitive to use?  
 Are the insertion device and the required 
materials readily available?  
Individual  Is the individual adequately qualified?  
 Has the individual had access to the training 
package?  
 Does the individual have regular opportunity to 
practise their skills?  
Work Environment  Is there enough space to carry out this task?  
 Can the task be carried out free from 
interruptions?  
 Are lighting and noise levels acceptable?  
Organisation  Are process measures e.g. audit or survey 
available for this task?  
 Are there regular meetings to discuss safety and 
quality concerns?  
 Are communication channels with device 




Device level: guidance available to manufacturers 
The applicator for insertion of the contraceptive implant is a key element within this 
activity.  Focusing in on the device level shown in Table 1, what guidance is available 
to manufacturers? For medical devices guidance exists in the form of international 
standards that support manufacturers in considering usability aspects and use errors.  
ISO 14971 (“Medical Devices - The Application of Risk Management to Medical 
Devices”)1 specifies that manufacturers need to consider reasonably foreseeable 
misuse (i.e. incorrect or improper use) and have controls in place to reduce the 
resultant risks to acceptable levels.  BS EN 62366 (“Medical Devices – Application of 
Usability Engineering to Medical Devices”)21 specifies a usability engineering process 
that allows manufacturers to assess and control risks that result from usability 
problems associated both with correct use and with use errors.        
 
The common route to controlling risks arising from user interaction with a device is 
through the provision of training - the intended method of use is reinforced.  
However, usability engineering also provides principles for the design of medical 
devices that are intended to make their use as intuitive and safe as possible - 
mistake-proofing the activity.  This is an important factor as devices are being used 
more widely and by practitioners who may not have received in-depth specialist 
training16 or who may not use them regularly.  It is also relevant when there is 
national cascade training and therefore scope for training variation.  The discussion 
below illustrates the types of factor that can be considered and exploited in order to 
reduce the risk of such interaction failures.         
 
Affordances 
Why do we intuitively know how to hold a pair of scissors?  Why can we easily open 
some doors but struggle with others?  The answer to these questions is to be found 
in those properties of objects that provide clues about their modes of operation.  
Norman19 refers to these perceived and actual properties as affordances.  When 
users take advantage of such affordances, the operation of the device becomes 
intuitive.  Devices that do not exploit the concept of affordances are often more 
difficult to use and make use errors more likely.   
 
We can apply the concept of affordances to the analysis of the implant applicator 
used for Implanon to better understand some forms of interaction with the device.  It 
appears that the applicator provides an affordance for a pushing rather than a pulling 
action, as it looks similar to a syringe. Ideally the applicator should provide an 
affordance for retraction, as this is the way it is intended to be used. The applicator 
could be held with one hand by placing the index finger and thumb as if one were 
about to give an injection, as indicated by the red arrows in Figure 2.  This is 
particularly relevant as the operator will have given a subcutaneous injection of 
lidocaine immediately before handling the applicator.  This affordance could be 
perceived to be stronger than the intentionally included affordance for holding the 
applicator, the ridged grip areas on either side of the cannula, indicated by the blue 
arrow.  This has practical implications for Steps 1 to 3 as described above.  The 
device also provides some visual feedback about the presence or absence of the 
implant before and after insertion, indicated by the orange arrow.   
 
If the applicator were to be held as if one were about to do a venepuncture, with 
thumb on top and fingers underneath, then although Step 2 might be accomplished 
without error, it would be impossible to perform Step 3 in a horizontal direction.  The 
direction of travel of the needle would be angled downwards, resulting in deep 
insertion. 
 
Holding the applicator incorrectly is also likely to make Step 5 more difficult.  The risk 
here is that the obturator is pushed, rather than fixed.  This could then lead to the 
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Fig. 2:  Affordances present in the applicator 
 
 
Redesign of the implant applicator would ideally eliminate the syringe-likeness that 
currently overshadows the useful affordance for holding it, and would include an 
affordance for retraction.  As it may not be possible to eliminate the affordance for 
mistakenly placing one’s index finger against the applicator seal, the design could try 
to make a pushing action meaningless by including a rounded and digit-shaped top 
for holding the device.  The digit-shape would indicate where to put one’s finger and 
the rounded edges would prevent the assumption of pushing.  Ideally, the design 
would also include an affordance for pulling the applicator backwards once the 
needle has been inserted into the skin.  In the original applicator design, there is only 
an affordance for holding it.   
 
Constraints 
Constraints are properties that restrict the ways in which a device can be used.  In 
this particular case, a physical constraint in the form of a forcing function has been 
designed successfully into the Implanon applicator.  A forcing function sets up a pre-
condition that has to be met before a particular action can be executed.  The safety 
seal is such a forcing function: it is physically possible to withdraw the 
cannula/needle only if the safety seal is broken.  The design of the device acts as a 
risk control measure.  However, this constraint does not prevent the error of 
removing the whole applicator from the arm with the implant remaining inside the 
needle.  This error can be made with the seal intact or broken.  This is the presumed 
error that leads to the majority of cases of non-insertion. 
 
Visibility, mapping and feedback 
An intuitive design should make it easy for the user to determine what actions are 
possible with the device and whether the actions have been carried out successfully 
or not.  The principles of visibility, mapping and feedback play an important role in 
achieving this.  Visibility refers to the property of a device that makes it easy for the 
user to determine which functions are available, while mapping refers to the property 
that allows determination of which controls are associated with which functions.  
Unintuitive or confusing mappings often cause interaction failures.  Feedback refers 
to properties and functions of the device that provide information to the user about 
what action has been executed and what result has been achieved.  Feedback is 
important in bridging the “gulf of evaluation”19, that is in increasing the ease with 
which the user can interpret the state of the device and the extent to which their 
intentions have been met.   
 
With Implanon the risks related to feedback that are now well recognised are non-
insertion and deep insertion10.  It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the implant 
has been successfully deployed.  This is principally due to the fact that the implant, 
once deployed, cannot easily be seen as it is beneath the skin, but there are also 
issues with the device itself relating to lack of feedback: the device does not provide 
straightforward indications about whether the implant is contained within the 
applicator or not.  An intuitive design solution should explore ways of providing such 
feedback.  To some extent this has been pursued by ensuring that the implant is 
visible at the front of the needle.  One solution would be for the obturator to be a 
different colour from the implant.  An increase in visibility of the implant at the bevel in 
the needle tip could further enhance this.  Windows or visible areas within the 
applicator could make it easier to see whether the implant is still present.   
  
      
 
Conclusion  
This paper assesses the reported risks associated with the insertion and removal of 
Implanon, based on 11 years of post-launch clinical experience.  In order to 
investigate the risks further, a formal study consisting of direct observation and 
analysis of procedures would be needed.  Such a study is now unlikely to be 
commenced as Implanon is about to be replaced with Nexplanon.  The documented 
risks are related to human action rather than to the pharmacological properties of the 
contraceptive implant.  The Discussion reviewed some principles for the design of 
devices that could reduce such risks and introduced a systems perspective through 
which adverse events relating to contraceptive implants may be explored.  The 
significant point is that risk management needs to account for the process and the 
conditions of use as much as for the pharmacological properties.  This is particularly 
true as contraceptive implants are becoming increasingly popular and widespread in 
use and may be deployed in differing situations and by non-specialists. 
 
It is therefore important to consider human factors at all stages of the development 
and use of such medical devices.  Training of clinicians is obviously essential and is 
relevant to optimal anatomical placement.  However this is not necessarily a solution 
to the problems of non-insertion and deep insertion, and is only one of many aspects 
of risk management that need to be considered.  
 
 
An initial assessment of Nexplanon  
Nexplanon , the successor to Implanon, is due for launch in the UK towards the end 
of 2010.  The applicator has been redesigned by the manufacturer and in addition, 
the implant itself has been made radio-opaque23.  Nexplanon is illustrated in the 
Commentary by Mansour in this issue of the Journal7. 
 
Nexplanon has new features when compared to Implanon23.  
 The entire shape and mechanism are different 
 The applicator is rendered unusable if there is no implant present within the 
needle.  In this situation the needle protection cap cannot be removed.  
 The applicator sets a pre-determined depth of the implant beneath the skin 
surface.  
 The finger-operated slider on the top surface facilitates one-handed 
completion of the insertion procedure.  This addresses difficulties with 
Implanon insertion Steps 4 and 5. 
 After completion of the backward movement of the slider, the needle is 
completely inside the body of the applicator, so reducing the risk of needle-
stick injury 
 The contrasting colour of the obturator improves differentiation from the 
implant.  
 
The manufacturer recommends that the operator should perform the insertion 
procedure while seated, so that some degree of direct visualisation of the needle is 
possible. 
 
It appears that the concept of affordances has been used in the re-design.  The 
affordance for holding during introduction of the needle into the skin remains, with 
some modification.  The syringe-likeness of the applicator has gone.  There is now a 
slider on top of the device with an indented shape that invites placement of a finger 
onto it.  This is remarkably like the suggestion made above by the authors of this 
article.  The one-handed release of the implant avoids the coordination of the hands 
previously needed in Steps 4 and 5.  The constraint of unlocking the safety seal has 
gone in the re-design.  This seal was specific to the old design and is not needed in 
the new applicator. 
 
The use of constraints is also evident. By setting the depth to which the needle can 
go beneath the skin surface, it makes it more difficult to carry out a deep insertion. 
Also, making the applicator unusable if there is no implant present within the needle 
is a forcing function; it sets up a precondition that the implant be present before 
action can continue.  
 
 
The obturator and implant are now in different colours.  This is an example of the 
principle of visibility. However, visualisation of the implant by the operator during the 
procedure is reduced compared to Implanon.  This means that feedback as to 
whether or not the implant has been successfully deployed is limited.  This may well 
be the reason behind some initial problems already seen with use of Nexplanon23.  
Visualisation of the needle during insertion is restricted because the “nose” of the 
applicator obscures the view.  This does not seem to be fully overcome by 
conducting the insertion in the sitting position, viewing the procedure from the side.  
Clinicians have reported that there is a need for better visualisation of the needle 
during insertion.  Also, a new problem has emerged, namely partial expulsion of the 
implant.  This is possibly related to the operator failing to insert the needle to its full 
length or allowing the device to move backwards when pulling back on the slider23. 
The authors feel that it would be premature to provide any preliminary assessment of 
this problem at the present moment, prior to the launch of Nexplanon.  
 
With the launch of the new applicator, manufacturers, risk managers and clinicians 
should continue to review the safety of the method, particularly bearing in mind 
human factors.  It is hoped that the redesign will reduce the chances of non-insertion, 
deep insertion and needlestick injury.  However, the redesign of the applicator cannot 




Recommendations for future development of contraceptive implants 
 
 Collect systematic data about the incidence, nature and type of risks 
associated with the use of implants  
 Establish the extent to which the various influencing factors contribute to 
those risks in practice 
 Incorporate human factors principles into risk management 
 Exploit affordances, visibility and feedback principles in the design of 
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